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On December 4, 1967 an amazed world learned that a South
African physician, Dr. Christian Barnard, had transplanted the heart of
one hopelessly injured patient into the body of another man who was
dying of advanced cardiac disease.' This unprecedented operation
brought the remarkable advances of medical technology over the pre-
vious fifty years into sharp focus. The major medical obstacle to suc-
cessful transplants had been the body's production of antibodies which
reject the introduction of foreign substances into the system.2 To fight
this rejection process, medical scientists developed a substance known
as antilymphocyteglobulin (ALG) .3 This substance performed excel-
lently in preventing the rejection process. However, it created a new
medical problem: ALG retards the production of lymphocytes which
create the rejection process but lymphocytes are necessary to fight off
infection in the body. This complication meant that doctors might be
successful in preventing rejection of a transplanted vital organ only to
lose the patient to infection.4
By 1967, these difficulties were sufficiently overcome to permit the
technical possibility of a human heart transplant. Scientists had been
* This article is a student work prepared by John E. Pearson, a former member of
the ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Re-
search. J.D., St. John's University Law School.
1 N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1967, at 1, col. 2.
2 Kutner, Due Process of Human Transplants: A Proposal, 24 U. MiAMI L. REv.
782, 783 (1970).
3 Id.
4 Weathersbee, Double-Edged Knife: Rejection/Infection, 93 Sci. NEWS 215
(1968).
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experimenting with animals and had man-
aged to keep dogs alive for over a year after
performing heart transplants on them.,
While the technical competence existed, no
surgical team was willing to perform the
operation on a human until Dr. Barnard did
so in 1967. Other doctors were apparently
reluctant to begin the human experimenta-
tion necessary to perfect this technique be-
cause of a fear that they would be compared
to physicians of Nazi Germany who experi-
mented on concentration camp prisoners. 6
The tremendous respect shown Dr. Barnard
throughout the world allayed this fear by
demonstrating to physicians that the public
favored transplant operations. The ensuing
release of professional anxiety is evidenced
by the fact that 101 transplants were at-
tempted in the year following the first heart
transplant.7
With heart transplants not only tech-
nically possible but also a reality after
1967, a long existing difference of opinion
between the law and medicine came to the
fore. This difference of professional opinion
concerned the definition of death. Medical
technology had made it possible for a patient
to have all his life-supporting organs, ex-
cept the brain, maintained by machines. 8
Black's Law Dictionary defines death as:
5 Smith, Someone Playing God, THE NATION,
Dec. 30, 1968, at 719.
6 id.
7Whatever Happened to ... Heart Transplants,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT, Sept. 14, 1970, at
84.
8 See Bi6rck, When Is Death?, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 484, 493. These machines include "artificial
respiration, instruments for defibrillation and
restoration of cardiac activities, external cardiac
massage, heart-lung machines and cardiac pace-
makers. . . ." Id.
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[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist;
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of
the circulation of the blood, and a cessa-
tion of the animal and vital functions con-
sequent thereon, such as respiration, pul-
sation, etcY
Unfortunately, this definition has been
cited with approval by some state courts.' 0
The problem with the definition as it in-
volves heart transplants is that it requires
the total cessation of the heart beat in order
for one to be considered legally dead. This
requirement has led to some unusual court
decisions."
Obviously, for a heart to be transplanted
to a recipient, the donor must be dead or
the surgical team has committed homicide.
The dilemma faced by medicine in this area
is that if the surgical team is forced to wait
until the donor is "legally dead" that is,
until the heart has stopped, the operation is
useless. As mentioned earlier, medical ad-
vances have made it possible for machines
to maintain all a patient's vital organs,
9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).
10 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 317
S.W.2d 275 (1958); Thomas v. Anderson, 96
Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950).
11 In Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1952), a husband and wife were both
struck by a train at a railroad crossing. The
husband's body was completely mutilated and
the wife was decapitated. Immediately after the
accident, a witness came upon the headless body
of the wife. Blood was spurting from the neck.
An action was brought by the survivors of the
wife who contended that she had survived the
husband under the Simultaneous Death Statute
of Kentucky. The court held that the wife had
indeed survived the "husband for a fleeting mo-
ment" as was "evidenced by the gushing of blood"
from the neck. Id. at 496-97. There was, of
course, no question that the wife's brain had
ceased functioning during the time she was held
to have survived her husband.
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except his brain, when the patient himself is
incapable of doing So. 12 Thus a patient with
a fatal, irreversible brain injury may be
kept "alive" indefinitely via medical ma-
chines. The financial cost of this care is
awesome. It can exceed $25,000 per year. 13
Besides the financial burden, maintenance
of such a patient takes up hospital room
and requires staff care.' 4 These facts raise
a very important question: should the
physiological or the vegetative life of man
control a realistic twentieth century de-
finition of death? No one would argue that
a patient maintained on medical machinery
with a dead brain is a whole human being.
Yet there are those who would hold a
physician guilty of homicide if he unplugs
life-supportive machinery. The medical pro-
fession believes that if a person's brain is
dead, the person is dead and the vital
organs maintained by machinery are merely
cellulous tissue which can and should be
used to aid living human beings.
A dead brain is a dead person. If the body
is still alive, the social being who is a mem-
ber of the human race no longer can exist
nor can he be reincarnated. Many of his
organs and tissues are still alive, respiring,
using oxygen, emitting carbon dioxide, and
burning substrates for energy. There is no
reason why they should not be transplanted
into the body of another person to help
12 See, e.g., Problems in the Meaning of Death,
SCIENCE, Dec. 11, 1970, at 1235, col. 1 (AAAS
Symposium); Collins, Limits of Medical Respon-
sibility in Prolonging Life, 206 J.A.M.A. 389
(1968); Death, When is Thy Sting, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 19, 1968, at 54; Thanatology, TIME, Aug.
16, 1968, at 66.
13 Death, When is Thy Sting?, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
19, 1968, at 54.
14 See generally Note, Scarce Medical Resources,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 620 (1969).
him continue the life to which he can for-
tunately still lay claim.15
Thus, the battle line between medicine
and the law has been drawn. Medicine
desires to take advantage of recent tech-
nological advances and proceed with heart
transplants. To do so safely, it needs a new
definition of death. It feels it has one, that
is, "brain death," and has established suf-
ficient proof and criteria to effectuate this
need. The law, on the other hand, appears
to be tenaciously clinging to its outmoded
definition. The stubborn position of the law
leaves the physician in a precarious posi-
tion: by proceeding under medicine's
"brain death" definition, he risks both civil
and criminal sanctions of the law which
recognizes only "heart death." This Note
will attempt to explore this difference of
professional opinion and offer suggestions
for a possible resolution.
"Legal Death" and the Problems it
Causes Physicians
As has been mentioned, Black's Law
Dictionary defines death as essentially
equivalent to the cessation of heart beat.'
To understand more fully the meaning of
this definition, it is useful to examine a few
cases. Most of the cases concerning the
exact moment of death and its definition
involve inheritance contests fought under
the various Simultaneous Death Statutes.
The issue of the exact moment of the ces-
sation of heartbeat arises rarely, if ever, in
other contexts.
15 Moore, Medical Responsibility for the Pro-
longation of Life, 206 J.A.M.A. 384, 386 (1968).
16 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
In Thomas v. Anderson,17 two men, each
of whom had willed his property and assets
to the other, lived together in the same
house. One had a heart attack. The other,
while aiding the first, also had a heart
attack. The attending physician arrived at
the scene after both had died. He was
unable to pinpoint the exact moment that
their hearts stopped beating. The court
cited Black's definition in determining that
the cessation of heartbeat is the moment of
death and went on to state:
[w]hile it may be said that persons who are
alive at the same time are living simul-
taneously, death occurs precisely when life
ceases and does not occur until the heart
stops beating and respiration ends. Death
is not a continuing event and is an event
that takes place at a precise time. i8
Modern medicine does not agree with this
statement. It sees death as a process and
not as an event.19 There can be both "brain
death" and "heart death." "Heart death"
can be viewed as the final biological death
of man, i.e., individual cells of his body
no longer receive oxygen, etc. "Brain
death," on the other hand, occurs prior
to this final biological death of man.
Through the use of the aforementioned
medical machines, 20 a patient can be main-
tained indefinitely after "brain death." The
Thomas decision would mandate this
prolongation of vegetative life since it de-
fines death as a single event which occurs
upon cessation of heartbeat. If the Thomas
17 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950).
18 Id. at 375, 215 P.2d at 482.
'9 See generally Bibrck, When is Death?, 1968
Wis L. REV. 484 (1968).
20 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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holding were followed, a patient in des-
perate need of a vital organ could die
needlessly while a potential donor, plugged
into life-supportive machinery, was con-
sidered technically alive. Although the
second patient would be "alive" in only the
vegetative sense of the word, he would be
unavailable for organ donation.
In Smith v. Smith,21 involving a husband
and wife who both died as a result of an
automobile accident, a similar result was
reached. Husband and wife had reciprocal
wills. The husband was pronounced dead
at the scene of the accident. The wife was
unconscious and died 17 days thereafter
without ever having regained conscious-
ness. The party claiming under the husband
in this action contended that both husband
and wife died simultaneously and that the
physicians had made a "vain attempt" to
save the already dead wife. The court held
that the wife did survive the husband, it
cited Black's definition of death verbatim.
It took judicial notice of the fact that the
wife did not meet the criteria of death as
set forth in Black's. Once again, a court
had held that the moment of "heart death"
controls. There are a few other cases which
concur with this definition 22 but there are
none which accept the medical "brain
death" criterion.
The major problem created by the legal
concept of "heart death" involves heart
transplants. The longer a physician is
forced to wait while a donor arrives at
technical "heart death," the less likely are
21 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
22 See, e.g., Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496
(Ky. Ct. App. 1952); Vaegemast v. Hess, 203
Minn. 207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938).
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the chances for a successful transplant. This
is true because the heart rapidly deterio-
rates upon the cessation of beating. While
it is possible that it can be made to resume
beating through electrical shock, the proba-
bilities are that many of its cells would
have been rendered useless because of lack
of oxygen.- :
Although the ability to prolong some life
functions has complicated the issue, physi-
cians now believe that the technical legal
definition of death is anachronistic. As a
whole, the medical profession appears to
be of the view that "[a]t present there is no
legal definition of the time of death based
on 20th century facts." '24
A recent transplant case in Houston,
Texas vividly demonstrates the medical
profession's position. Dr. Denton A. Cooley,
a world-renowned heart surgeon, was in
need of a heart donor. The proposed
recipient was a middle aged man dying
from advanced cardiac disease. In a nearby
Houston hospital, a patient was admitted
with a severely damaged brain; his skull
had been fractured during a brawl. The
wife of the brain-injured patient was kind
enough to consent to a heart transplant
when she was informed by physicians that
her husband's condition was hopeless. He
was immediately transferred to Dr. Cooley's
hospital. A problem arose because the
donor's death, since it resulted from a
23 See generally Elkinton, The Dying Patient,
The Doctor, and the Law, 13 VILL. L. REv. 740
(1968); Muller, Legal Medicine and the Deter-
muination of Death, 14 WORLD MED. J. 140
(1967).
24 Ford, Human Organ Transplantation: Legal
Aspects, 15 CATHOLIC LAW. 136, 140 (1969).
fight, was classified a homicide. The county
medical examiner was uncertain as to
whether or not an autopsy, required by law
in homicide cases, could be performed if
the victim's heart was removed. The at-
tending physician for the donor had already
declared his patient dead based on "brain
death" and he so informed the medical
examiner. (The donor had flat brain waves
on the electroencephalogram. This is one
of the criteria for "brain death" which will
be discussed later in this Note.) Dr. Cooley
informed the medical examiner that the
donor's heart was being kept alive by ma-
chine. He stated that without the machine
the donor would be dead according to the
legal "heart death" requirements. The
medical examiner warned Dr. Cooley of
the possible legal ramifications but said
that he would not press charges for inter-
fering with an autopsy. The doctor went
ahead with the transplant. The medical ex-
aminer held an autopsy and attributed the
donor's death to the brain injury.21 The
obvious problem created by this situation
is-in a criminal prosecution for homi-
cide based on assault and subsequent
death, how would a court have ruled had
the defendant's counsel raised the argument
that the victim was not legally dead at the
time of the transplant and that the de-
fendant could not therefore be guilty of
homicide? If the defendant was not guilty
of homicide, would Dr. Cooley and his
surgical team be responsible for the donor's
death and thus be guilty of homicide? In-
cidents such as these have evoked much
public alarm over the idea that a patient
25 Redefining Death, NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1968,
at 68.
will be considered dead when his doctor
says he is dead. 26 It has been stated that
some people now actually fear hospitals
because they are apprehensive that their
lives may be purposely shortened in order
that they may be made transplant donors.27
Another area of concern expressed by
many physicians in relation to the differ-
ence between medicine's "brain death"
concept and the law's "heart death" re-
quirement is possible criminal and civil
liabilities for following the generally ac-
cepted medical practice of "brain death."
"Transplants are being undertaken with
doubt, in many instances, as to whether the
donor was indeed dead." s28 In the realm of
criminal law, it is indeed possible for an
overzealous surgeon to remove the heart
of a "living" donor. If the donor is "living"
under both medical and legal standards,
the physician is guilty of homicide and
should be prosecuted. A much more com-
plicated case exists when the patient is
medically dead ("brain death") but legally
alive (heartbeat continues). Technically
the physician could be indicted for homi-
cide.2 9 Under New York's Penal Law, a
person is guilty of murder when:
26 Smith, Someone Playing God, TiE NATION,
Dec. 30, 1968, at 719.
27 David, When is a Transplant Legal Murder?,
Chi. Daily News, Nov. 17, 1968 (Magazine),
at 3, col. 1.
28 See Kutner, supra note 2, at 787.
29 See generally Wecht & Aranson, Medical-
Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Trans-
plantation, 18 DE PAuL L. REV. 488 (1969);
Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects
of Human Organ Transplantation, 14 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 442 (1965); Note, Scarce Medical
Resources, 69 CoLuM. L. REV. 620 (1969).
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with intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of such per-
son .... 30
This definition would support an indict-
ment of a physician who transplanted a
heart before legal death had occurred.
The possibility of a homicide charge can
arise easily even when no transplant is to
take place. If a person is medically dead
and is on a respirator or some other type
of life-supporting machine, it has been said
by some authorities that a physician is
guilty of homicide if he simply unplugs the
machine.3 1 To date, in only one such case
has a U.S. physician been indicted and he
was not convicted.32 In theory at least,
there is no distinction between homicide
committed with a gun or by turning off a
medical machine.3 3 Both acts are com-
mitted "[w]ith intent to cause the death of
another person. '8 4 The law so far has not
recognized "brain death" as an excuse or
justification for the latter type of act.35 The
motive of the physician, as distinguished
from his intent, is irrelevant.36 A few years
ago, a Swedish doctor was determined to
have "failed to have followed proper medi-
cal standards" in turning off a life-sus-
taining machine. This decision was reached
by the Swedish Central Medical Board.
The doctor had requested permission of a
patient's family to turn off the machinery as
30 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney
1967).
81 Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv.
999 (1967).
32 N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1950, at 1, col. 6.
33 Fletcher, supra note 31, at 1000.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1006.
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the case was hopeless and the patient's
family was suffering needless emotional and
financial hardship. The family later com-
plained to the Medical Board which found
him guilty as charged. When the doctor
sought judicial review, however, he was
absolved of all guilt. The court stated that
he acted properly. The patient was dying
and the doctor was correct in requesting
the family to decide whether the fruitless
prolongation of life should continue. The
physician's use of extraordinary means to
keep the patient alive played a major role
in the court's holding.37 Fortunately, at the
present time, doctors are not being prose-
cuted for turning off medical machines.
Nor would the Roman Catholic Church
hold a physician morally culpable for turn-
ing off a medical machine in the case of
a hopelessly ill patient whose brain was
irreversibly dead. Pope Pius XII stated
that life-supporting machinery is an extra-
ordinary treatment, and that a doctor need
only give ordinary treatment .3 Therefore,
a doctor may cease to give extraordinary
care since it is not the cessation of extra-
ordinary care that kills the patient but
rather the disease which caused the physi-
cian to resort to the extraordinary means
in the first place. While this analysis would
appear to be a worthwhile approach for
the law to pursue, it is really a short-lived
solution to the legal-medical problem be-
cause what is extraordinary today often
becomes ordinary tomorrow.39
37 Ayd, When is a Person Dead?, 4 LAWYER'S
MED. J. 81 (1968) [hereinafter Ayd].
38 Ford, Human Organ Transplantation: Legal
Aspects, 15 CATHOLIC LAW. 136, 142 (1969).
39 See generally Elkinton, The Dying Patient,
The Doctor, and the Law, 13 VILL. L. REv. 740
(1968).
The physician also faces civil liability in
connection with both transplants and life-
supportive machinery. With regard to
transplants, the doctor owes the potential
donor all the duties and obligations in-
herent in the doctor-patient relationship.
Should he anticipate the death of the donor
and fail to live up to his responsibilities in
the doctor-patient relationship, he can be
held liable for the wrongful death of his
patient under the "abandoned patient"
doctrine.40 Suits have also been commenced
or threatened when physicians transplanted
organs of donors without permission. It is
universally recognized that the deceased's
next-of-kin have rights to his body con-
current with their duty to bury it. It is an
actionable wrong for the surgeon to re-
move an organ and thus mutilate the body
without permission.
41
The controversy over transplants has
created ethical dilemmas for the medical
profession. In the first place, transplants
involve experimentation with humans in
the place of guinea pigs. In both heart and
kidney transplants, an irreplaceable vital
organ is actually removed from the recip-
ient's body. If, for any reason, the surgical
40 See generally, Levin, The Abandoned Patient,
1965 INS. L. J. 275.
41 Transplants, Question of Timing, TIME, June
7, 1968, at 51. This article discusses the case of a
victim of a traffic accident in Brazil who could
not be identified. The surgeons went ahead with
the transplant. Subsequently, the widow of the
accident victim-donor threatened to sue. Ironi-
cally, there was a bill pending in the Brazilian
Legislature which would have made the surgeons'
actions legal. The reason the bill was delayed
in passage is that it would have granted a de-
ceased's mistress priority over parents, brothers
and sisters in granting permission for an organ
transplant.
procedure is a failure, the recipient is
doomed to die. At present, it can be stated
generally that the prognosis for recipient
survival in heart transplants is negative.
4 2
As of September, 1970, 162 attempted
heart transplants had been recorded since
the first human transplant took place on
December 3, 1967. Of these, only 21
recipients were still alive. Of the American
patients operated on, two had lived for
more than two years and nine had survived
for more than one. Worldwide, a patient
has roughly a one in six chance of sur-
viving one year. Of those who do not live
for one year after the operation, the
average survival period is 47 days.'-
With such a poor record of success, the
question whether these experiments should
continue has become an ethical one. One
professor of moral theology feels that a
transplant must meet three criteria in order
to be ethical and moral. Basically, these
criteria are: (1) the transplant must be a
necessary measure of last resort, that is,
there must be absolute certainty of imme-
diate death without the operation; (2)
there must be a "reasonable hope of sub-
stantial benefit to the recipient," that is,
the recipient's life will be sufficiently pro-
longed to justify the dangers inhering in
this radical operation; and (3) the surgical
team must be fully competent to make the
transplant. It cannot be using the recipient
to sharpen its skills for a future date. 44
42 Smith, Someone Playing God, THE NATION,
Dec. 30, 1968, at 719; A Plea for a Transplant
Moratorium, 93 ScL. NEWS 256 (1968).
43 Whatever Happened to . . . Heart Transplants,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT, Sept. 14, 1970, at
84.
44 Lynch, Ethics of the Heart Transplant,
AMERICA, Feb. 10, 1968, at 194.
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The donor's exact moment of death
poses a different ethical problem. Since
medicine must respect the sanctity of
human life, it cannot ethically anticipate
the death of a donor in order to save the
life of another through the transplant of a
vital organ. Physicians feel that they can
prove that the moment of "brain death"
is the true time of death for a human
being.4, To ensure that this definition is
followed carefully and to prevent the un-
ethical practice of anticipating the death
of donors, the medical profession has
set up admirable self-policing policies.1 "
One guideline, for example, prohibits the
physician who pronounces the donor dead
from being a member of the surgical trans-
plant team. 47
The new medical definition of death
poses another ethical problem for a physi-
cian when he determines that his patient
has suffered "brain death," a determination
permitting the life-supportive machinery to
be turned off. Many a physician has great
hope that a cure for whatever fatal ailment
his patient is suffering from will be dis-
covered imminently. In some cases, this
false hope subconsciously makes the physi-
cian refuse to accept the fact of death.
While such devotion and dedication is ad-
mirable, a question arises as to its wisdom.
Is it ethical to maintain this false hope
and thus prolong the indignity to which
the machine subjects the body, as well as
45 See A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205
J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
46 Kutner, supra note 2, at 789-93.
47 Supra note 45, at 338; Ethical Guidelines for
Organ Transplantation, 205 J.A.M.A. 341, 341-42
(1968).
THE TIME OF DEATH
the emotional and financial burden ex-
perienced by the patient's family?48
Some Attempted Legal Solutions
As this Note already mentioned, physi-
cians following the "brain death" criterion
are theoretically criminally liable for homi-
cide when they either turn off life-support-
ive machinery or transplant vital organs
before "heart death" has occurred. 49 With
regard to culpability for turning off medical
machinery after "brain death," one scholar
has persuasively contended that no criminal
guilt should attach to this procedure be-
cause it is an omission as opposed to a
commission. 50 He suggests that merely be-
cause an act involves physical movement, it
is not necessarily an act of commission for
which criminal penalties should attach.
Most criminal statutes defining homicide
require the perpetrator to do some act
which is intended to cause death.5'1 Both
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
Dean Prosser define an act of commission
as "[a]n external manifestation of the
actor's will."'5 2 In attempting to overcome
this definitional obstacle to his theory,
Professor Fletcher contends that an act of
commission is one which causes harm as
opposed to an act of omission which merely
permits it.13 The question would then be-
does the turning off of a medical machine
48 Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to
the Fatally I/, 206 J.A.M.A. 387, 388 (1968).
49 See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
50 See Fletcher, supra note 31, at 1007.
51 See, e.g., text accompanying note 30 spra.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O TORTS § 2
(1965); W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 335
(3d ed. 1964).
,3 Fletcher, supra note 31, at 1007.
cause the death of a patient or merely
permit it? He maintains that the machinery
merely prolongs life and that, therefore, if
we cease prolongation, we are merely per-
mitting death to occur, not causing it. The
hopeless condition of the patient is the
actual cause of death and not the turning
off of the machine. 54 This position is some-
what tenuous and has never been judicially
accepted.
Physicians have also attempted to justify
the turning off of medical machinery on the
theory that the machines became necessary
for another patient's well-being and the dis-
connected patient would have died in any
event.55 A similar justification has been
rejected by at least one court.
The medical profession's attempted use
of the omission-commission distinction fails
completely in the area of heart transplants.
It is not possible to argue logically that
removing the heart of a donor who has
suffered "brain death" is anything other
than an act of commission which causes
harm. For this reason it appears that the
only real solution to the problem is a new
definition of death based on modern medi-
cal advances.
Perhaps the most sensible step taken by
any legal body with respect to the defini-
tion of death was that of the commissioners
who drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act. They refused to define death. It was
their feeling that "[t]his was a medical
question currently in a state of flux rather
54 Id. at 1008.
55 Kutner, supra note 2, at 797.
511 United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No.
15, 383) (E.D. Pa. 1842).
than a problem for legal codification."'57
They therefore inserted a section into the
Act which simply requires that the decision
as to the time of death be made either by
the attending physician or the doctor who
certifies death.58 This position has been
praised by the medical community. 9 By
June of 1971, 48 states had adopted the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, including
the language supporting medicine's position
that the individual physician should be the
one to decide the exact time of death."
In 1970, Kansas became the first state
to recognize "brain death" as legal death."'
57 Smith & Smith, Kansas and the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, 19 KAN. L. REV. 547
(1971).
58 UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 7(b)
(1968) reads:
The true time of death shall be determined
by a physician who tends the donor at his
death, or, if none, the physician who certifies
the death. The physician shall not participate
in the procedure for removing or transplanting
a part.
59 Moore, Burch, et al., Cardiac and Other
Organ Transplantation, 206 J.A.M.A. 2489, 2496
(1968)
In considering the question of when death
occurs in a transplant situation, it is believed
that the determination of "the time of death"
must be a medical determination and is not
the proper subject for codification by law.
The subject is correctly treated in the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act ....
60 Featherstone, The Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, The Law's Approach to a Human Need, 110
TRUST & ESTATES 468 (1971).
61 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (supp. 1971)
provides:
Definition of Death
A person will be considered medically and
legally dead if in the opinion of a physician
based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice, there is the absence of spontaneous
respiratory and cardiac function and, because
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The purpose of the law was to make clear
the exact moment of death in order that
heart transplant operations could pro-
ceed.62 The statute was apparently passed
in reaction to the decision in United Trust
Co. v. Pyke.63 This case had stated that
"death is the comolete cessation of all vital
functions without possibility of resuscita-
tion. 014 When Kansas passed the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act in 1968, it was felt
by physicians that an enabling step had
been taken by the legislature. They quickly
learned, however, that, the 1968 Act not-
withstanding, if the Pyke decision was
strictly enforced, heart transplants would
not be feasible in Kansas. Pyke introduced
of the disease or condition which caused,
directly or indirectly, these functions to cease,
or because of the passage of time since these
functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation
are considered hopeless; and, in this event,
death will have occurred at the time these
functions ceased; or (a) person will be con-
sidered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if
based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice, during reasonable attempts to either
maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory
or respiratory function in the absence of afore-
said brain function, it appears that further
attempts at resuscitation or supportive main-
tenance will not succeed, death will have
occurred at the time when these conditions
first coincide. Death is to be pronounced be-
fore artificial means of supporting respiratory
and circulatory function are terminated and
before any vital organ is removed for pur-
poses of transplantation. These alternative
definitions of death are to be utilized for all
purposes in this state, including the trials of
civil and criminal cases, any laws to the con-
trary notwithstanding.
02 39 J.B.A. KAN. 107, 188 (1970).
63 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967).
64 Id. at 4, 427 P.2d at 71.
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the concept of "heart death" into Kansas.
Previously, there had been no actual defi-
nition of death there. This is true of most
states. The 1970 statute was passed in
order to return the decision as to the exact
moment of death to the medical profession,
where the legislature obviously felt it be-
longed. 65
"Medical Death" and the Role
of the Physician
In 1964, Doctor Hannibal Hamlin en-
couraged physicians to judge the time of
death through the use of the electro-
encephalogram (EEG). He felt that a flat
brain wave recorded by this instrument was
generally proof of death. He acknowledged
that there were a few times when a flat
EEG would not support a death diagnosis.
Those few instances, he felt, were known
and physicians would not rely on the EEG
alone. Doctor Hamlin pointed out that, be-
cause of life-supportive machinery, it was
then possible for a patient to have a flat
EEG but a "respectable EKG" (electro-
cardiogram). He also noted that man is
distinct from all other life on earth because
of his brain and not his heart. The defini-
tion of death as proposed by Doctor
Schwab, Chief of the electroencephalograph
unit at Massachusetts General Hospital
was discussed by Doctor Hamlin. Doctor
Schwab outlined a procedure for ascer-
taining death. He recommended four
criteria. They are:
1. No spontaneous respiration for a mini-
mum of 60 minutes.
6.5 Letter from Loren F. Taylor, M.D., J.D. to
the Journal of the American Medical Association,
215 J.A.M.A. 296 (1971).
2. No reflex response (superficial, deep,
organic, etc.). No change in heart rate
on ocular or carotid sinus pressure.
3. EEG: Flat lines with no rhythms in
any leads for at least 60 minutes of
continuous recording. No EEG re-
sponse to auditory or somatic stimuli
or to electrical stimulation. Two longer
periods of total flat recording some
hours apart may be preferred by some.
4. Normal basic laboratory data including
electrolyte pattern.66
This paper presented by Dr. Hamlin at
the 1964 American Medical Association
(AMA) meeting is evidence of the fact
that concern was being expressed over the
legal definition of death long before the
first heart transplant in 1967. Unfortu-
nately, the theory of a flat EEG as being
sufficient evidence to prove death has been
shown to be erroneous. In 1969, an
Israeli boy was admitted to Hadassah Hos-
pital with severe brain damage. He met all
five criteria of death as had been set forth
in June of 1968 by the Council for Inter-
national Organization of Medical Science.
One of these criteria was a flat EEG.6 7
The physicians in charge of the boy refused
to abandon hope. The child remained on
drugs and an artificial respirator for a two
week period and was medically dead by
the Council's criteria during the entire
time. Suddenly there was a change in the
"dead" boy's condition. He regained brain
activity and, eventually, normal health.
This incident demonstrated vividly that the
Council's criteria needed revision. It ob-
viously would have been fruitless to re-
66 Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A.
112, 113-14 (1964).
67 Defining Death Anew, 95 Sci. NEws 50
(1969).
quire that each person who met these
criteria remain in such a state for a two
week period. This would frustrate all trans-
plant possibilities. The problem faced by
the Council was to find the exact point
where the brain is completely and irre-
vocably lost and the organs are intact for
transplant.0 8 The surgeons who cared for
the boy were able to develop a new criterion
to be added to the Council's five, 69 namely,
the brain's consumption of oxygen must be
measured. If the brain is alive, it must
consume oxygen, no matter what the
reading may be on the EEG.7 0 Another
problem with relying wholly upon a flat
EEG for a determination of death is that
patients with flat EEGs who are on anes-
thetic drug levels or in hibernation, may
recover some brain activity.7'
One dispute that broke out in the medical
fraternity concerning EEGs centered
around a difference of opinion as to how
long the EEG had to be flat in order to
declare the patient dead. Although physi-
cians disagreed among themselves, the com-
monly accepted time was 24 hours r.7 2
68 Id.
609 The five criteria are:
1. Loss of all response to environment.
2. Complete abolition of reflexes and loss of
muscle tone.
3. Cessation of spontaneous respiration.
4. Abrupt fall in arterial blood pressure.
5. Flat EEG.
7o Letter of Loren F. Taylor, sapra note 65.
71 Silverman, Saunders, Schwab & Masland,
Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram,
209 J.A.M.A. 1505 (1969). A questionnaire was
sent to members of the American Electroenceph-
alographic Society. The results showed that of
1665 isoelectric EEG's, only seven patients re-
covered any cerebral function. Id. at 1505-09.
72 Id. at 1509; Ayd, supra note 37, at 81.
18 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1972
While the EEG has not proven to be 100
percent reliable, medicine has not been
deterred in its attempts to have "brain
death" recognized legally. Physicians set
out to find the criteria which, when coupled
with a flat EEG, would establish beyond
refute that the brain was irreversibly lost
and the patient was therefore dead. One
doctor went so far as to establish a score
card for death. He used five criteria in his
theory and assigned two points to each. If
a person scored four or under, he would be
considered dying. If he received a grade of
five or over, he would be viewed as a possi-
ble recovery. A decreasing score indicated
impending death while an increasing one
indicated a chance of recuperation. 73 In
order to perform heart and liver trans-
plants, medical science needed a reason-
able set of criteria which could be verified
in order to demonstrate that a man was
dead when his brain died.
In support of the "brain death" test, two
internationally known experts have stated:
The basis for such a definition must be-
you are dead when your brain doesn't
function anymore-not when your heart
has stopped beating. When the electrical
activity of one's brain stops-which can
be measured-life is gone and what is left
is only a surviving organism which can be
used to save the lives of other people.74
We should distinguish between being
7:3 Dr. Vincent J. Collins of Cook County Hos-
pital devised this plan. The five criteria he used
were: heartbeat; pulse; brain activity (as shown
by EEG); reflexes; and breathing. Scorecard for
Death, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1968, at 61.
74 Statement of Professor Crafoord of the Karo-
linska Institute of Stockholm, quoted in Ayd,
supra note 37, at 85.
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alive and a live state that can be main-
tained artificially. We can say that death
has occurred if the brain is no longer in a
living state, even if it can be maintained
as a living tissue by artificial means. 7 5
In 1968 the Ad Hoc Committee of the
Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death issued a report
entitled A Definition of Irreversible
Coma.7" The Committee stated that any
organ that did not function was dead.
Medicine's goal then, was to arrive at a
definition of a non-functioning brain. They
listed three steps involved in a deep and
irreversible coma. These were:
1. Unreceptivity and unresponsivity-this
entails total unawareness of externally
applied stimuli.
2. Neither movements nor breathing-if
the patient is on an artificial respirator,
it must be turned off for at least three
minutes to ascertain whether the pa-
tient attempts spontaneous respiration.
3. Absolutely no reflexes-the pupils must
be fixed and dilated and must not re-
spond to direct light. There can be no
ocular movement, blinking, postural ac-
tivity, swallowing, yawning, vocaliza-
tion, nor corneal or pharyngeal re-
flexes. 77
If the patient meets all three of these
criteria he is in an irreversible coma, ac-
cording to the Ad Hoc Committee, and will
die. An EEG should be taken for "con-
75 Statement of Dr. Keith Simpson, Director of
Forensic Medicine, Guy's Hospital Medical
School, London, id. at 86.
7W A Definition of Irreversible Coma, supra note
45; Science and the Citizen; What is Death?,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 1968, at 84.
77 A Definition of Irreversible Coma, supra note
45, at 338.
firmatory value." It should be taken again
24 hours later and, if there is no change
after this second EEG, the physician may
declare the patient dead. He should declare
the patient dead before turning the respi-
rator off.7 8 The Committee states that death
is an irreversible coma. There is no need
to change any statute in its opinion since
the law in most states has always treated
the moment of death as a question to be
determined by physicians. The only time a
statute would be necessary is if the subject
becomes too controversial. 7  The Harvard
Committee also stated that the only reason
that the legal definition went unchallenged
for so long was that, until recently, there
had never been medical machinery avail-
able to support life.
While the Ad Hoc Committee was meet-
ing at Harvard, the World Medical Associa-
tion met in Sydney, Australia in order to
explore this medical-legal dispute.80 The
documents produced by the two committees
were so amazingly similar that it would
serve no useful purpose to list the criteria
set forth by the World Medical Association,
having already enumerated the criteria in
the Ad Hoc Committee's report. Both the
Harvard group and the Sydney group
agreed that at least two physicians should
share the responsibility of determining
death and that the doctors declaring death
could not take part in a transplant involv-
ing that particular patient. 8'
The Ad Hoc Committee Report raised
a question as to exactly what procedure a
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Thanatology, TIME, Aug. 16, 1968, at 66.
81 Id.
physician should follow when he feels his
patient is dying and meets most but not
all of the criteria set forth in the Ad Hoc
Committee Report. Three physicians au-
thored a paper on this point, which now
seems to be standard medical practice.
They recommend that the doctor: (1) have
an EEG taken; (2) call in a neurosurgeon
or a neurologist; (3) both should examine
the patient and record their findings, and
repeat this procedure 24 hours later; and
(4) if, after the second examination, both
feel that the patient is dead-take away the
machine and notify the family.8 2
It has been suggested that if doctors can
prove that the criteria they have set up are
genuine tests of death of the cerebrum, the
law must then decide exactly when this
cessation of cerebral activity without the
stoppage of heartbeat, etc., would be rec-
ognized as legal death83 and thus allow a
heart transplant while the heart is still
beating. One legal writer has recently
agreed with the medical theory and has
proposed that a statute be enacted which
would enumerate the following six criteria
as a definition of death:
1. complete bilateral mydriasis;
2. complete absence of reflexes, both nat-
ural and in response to profound pain;
3. complete absence of spontaneous res-
piration;
4. falling blood pressure, necessitating in-
creasing amounts of vasopressive drugs;
5. a flat electroencephalogram; and
82 Beecher, Adams & Sweet, Procedures for the
Appropriate Management of Patients Who May
Have Supportive Measures Withdrawn, 209
J.A.M.A. 405 (1969).
83 Elkinton, The Dying Patient, The Doctor and
the Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 740, 745 (1968).
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6. measurement of oxygen consumed by
the brain.84
Conclusion
This type of proposed statute is open to
much criticism. It involves highly technical
terms which, as evidenced by the past few
years, are subject to rapid change and
obsolescence. The Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act appears to be working extremely
well without a definition of death at all.
Many physicians have expressed doubt as
to whether the law should even attempt to
define death.85 The recent Kansas statute
which theoretically redefines death so as
to recognize "brain death" really does no
more than cast the burden of deciding when
death occurs back to the parties to whom
this decision belongs-physicians. Further-
more, by enacting a statute which details
today's medical advances, would we not
run the risk of hindering tomorrow's break-
through? The reason for proposing such a
statute is that the law has retained an out-
moded standard despite medical proof that
the definition is no longer useful. Medicine
has not reached perfection, however. There
will be new discoveries and developments.
Why chance having this proposed statute
retard the advancement of medical science?
Admittedly, it is difficult to envision such a
statute hindering medical progress. But
then again, how many people fifty years ago
would have predicted that there would be
84 Kutner, supra note 2, at 804.
85 See, e.g., Page, The Ethics of Heart Trans-
plantation, 207 J.A.M.A. 109 (1969); Sadler,
Sadler, and Stason, The Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, 206 J.A.M.A. 2501 (1968); Collins,
Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging
Life, 206 J.A.M.A. 389 (1968).
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a controversy concerning the difference
between "heart death" and "brain death"?
Altogether, it seems wisest that we follow
the lead of the drafters of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act by leaving the decision
as to the time of death to the physicians.
Postscript
The medical concept of "brain death" re-
ceived jury endorsement shortly after re-
search for this article was completed. On
May 26, 1972, a jury sitting in Richmond,
Va., found doctors associated with the
Medical College of Virginia free of liability
for the death of a man whose heart had
been transplanted.' The landmark verdict
1 Harold A. Schmeck, Jr., Brain Death: When
was based on the panel's determination that
Bruce 0. Tucker, who suffered massive
brain damage in an accident, was dead at
the moment his heart was removed al-
though his respiration and circulation were
being maintained by machines. The plain-
tiff, Tucker's brother, claimed that, since
Tucker's heart was beating, he was alive
despite the fact that, under "brain death"
criteria, he had been dead for several hours.
The decision was praised by medical au-
thorities. 2
Editors
Does Life Cease, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1972, § 4,
at 7, col. I.
2 Id.

